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ABSTRACT
The enthusiasm of Chinese leaders for renewable energy is infused with a pragmatic
variant of techno-nationalist ideology. In keeping with this outlook, Beijing sup-
ports Chinese wind and solar firms, but it typically proves flexible when important
economic partners challenge such policies.
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CHINA’S ENTHUSIASM FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY is impressive. In 2005, when
China passed its Renewable Energy Law, the country had 117 gigawatts (GW)
of hydroelectric capacity but almost no wind, solar, or biomass power. By
2012, China had nearly 70 GW of capacity in these latter three energy
sources, thanks to the new law as well as a series of follow-on regulations,
amendments, and targets. The lion’s share, 63 GW, of that capacity came
from wind power, making China the largest producer of wind energy in the
world. In fact, renewable and nuclear power accounted for 94% of the growth
in Chinese electricity generation in 2012. As a result, China met more than
9% of its primary energy demand from non-fossil sources that year, a ﬁgure
that it plans to raise to 11.4% by 2015 and 15% by 2020.1
ANDREW B. KENNEDY is Senior Lecturer in Policy and Governance at the Crawford School of
Public Policy at the Australian National University (ANU). He is the author of The International
Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efﬁcacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy (Cambridge
2012). He wishes to thank Lynette Ong, Pan Rongfang, anonymous reviewers, and participants at the
2011 Australian Political Studies Association Conference for constructive comments and assistance
with this essay.
1. For the data in this paragraph, see International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007
(Paris: OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], 2007), p. 597; Trevor
Houser, ‘‘China’s 2012 Energy Report Card,’’ February 27, 2013, <http://rhg.com/notes/chinas-2012-
energy-report-card>; ‘‘Analysts Forecast Lackluster Q2 for Solar PV Sector,’’ Xinhua, March 13, 2013,
accessed through Factiva; and Olivia Boyd, ‘‘China’s Installed Wind Capacity up 41 Percent in 2012,’’
IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, April 9, 2013, accessed through Factiva.
Asian Survey, Vol. 53, Number 5, pp. 909–930. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X.© 2013 by
the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and
Permissionswebsite,http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp.DOI: 10.1525/AS.2013.53.5.909.
909
There is much to praise about China’s enthusiasm for renewable energy.
To the extent that it substitutes for fossil fuels, renewable energy helps to slow
the growth of China’s greenhouse gas emissions while alleviating its notorious
air pollution more generally. Renewable energy also promises to improve
China’s energy security, both by diversifying its sources of supply and by
reducing its need to import supplies.2 Nonetheless, the way in which China
has promoted renewable energy has also raised tensions with other countries.
In particular, while promoting new energy supplies, the Chinese government
has also sought to reduce its dependence on the outside world for energy
technology. Through a range of regulations and subsidies, Beijing has sup-
ported Chinese renewable energy companies at the expense of foreign com-
petitors. In the process, China’s government has run afoul of foreign
companies and governments that wish to do business with China, and accu-
sations have been made that China is not living up to its commitments under
the World Trade Organization (WTO).
To make sense of China’s enthusiastic––and nationalistic––approach to
renewable energy, this essay emphasizes the role of ‘‘techno-nationalism’’ in
Chinese thinking about this emerging sector. The desire to promote indig-
enous technology is not a new phenomenon in China; it can be traced back
to China’s humiliation at the hands of industrializing countries in the 19th
century. And it has certainly been prominent during earlier periods of the
communist era. Under Mao, China invested precious resources in nuclear
and missile technologies––the ‘‘two bombs and one satellite’’ (liang dan yi
xing). Deng Xiaoping launched programs in the 1980s to promote techno-
logical advances in the civilian economy. Under the recent leadership of Hu
Jintao and Wen Jiabao, however, Chinese techno-nationalism experienced
a remarkable renaissance. In 2006, Hu and Wen unveiled the National
Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Develop-
ment (2006–20) (MLP), to rapidly advance ‘‘indigenous innovation’’ in
China. In 2010, the government added a more focused plan to speed the
development of seven ‘‘Strategic Emerging Industries,’’ an effort to place
Chinese companies at the frontier of technological innovation. As this essay
will explain, renewable energy occupies an important place in these visions of
China’s technological future.
2. On China’s thinking about energy security, see Andrew B. Kennedy, ‘‘China’s New Energy-
Security Debate,’’ Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 52:3 (2010), pp. 137–58.
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The remainder of this essay consists of three separate sections. The ﬁrst
brieﬂy explains the concept of ‘‘techno-nationalism,’’ building on previous
work in this area and noting the different forms it can take. The second
section describes the resurgence of techno-nationalism in China in recent
years, both in broad terms and with respect to renewable energy in particular,
and highlights the pragmatic character of China’s thinking. The third section
evaluates the congruence between China’s pragmatic techno-nationalism and
its support for domestic companies in the wind and solar sectors. The essay
concludes by summing up the ﬁndings and considering possible avenues for
future research.
TECHNO-NATIONALISM: A BRIEF REVIEW
The term ‘‘techno-nationalism’’ dates to 1987, when Robert Reich coined the
term in an essay for The Atlantic. Reich was focused on U.S. technology
policy in particular, and he saw techno-nationalism as an attempt to ‘‘protect
future American technological breakthroughs from exploitation at the hands
of foreigners, especially the Japanese.’’3 Since then, scholars have used the
term to characterize technology policy in a variety of national contexts, most
frequently in Asia’s rapidly developing economies. As the literature has
grown, deﬁnitions of techno-nationalism have proliferated. Reich was
focused on a dominant power that was concerned with protecting its tech-
nological edge. Subsequent writers have seen techno-nationalism more as
a developmental creed. Writing about Japan, for example, Richard Samuels
deﬁned techno-nationalism as ‘‘the belief that technology is a fundamental
element in national security, that it must be indigenized, diffused, and nur-
tured in order to make a nation rich and strong.’’4 Adam Segal and David
Kang have written about it in more historically speciﬁc terms, describing it as
‘‘the desire of Asian states to free themselves from dependence on western
technologies.’’5
Despite this variety, there are some common threads in the literature. First,
whether the focus is defensive or developmental, there is broad agreement that
3. Robert Reich, ‘‘The Rise of Technonationalism,’’ The Atlantic (May 1987), p. 62.
4. Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological
Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. x.
5. Adam Segal and David Kang, ‘‘The Siren Song of Techno-nationalism,’’ Far Eastern Economic
Review (March 2006), <http://www.feer.com/articles1/2006/0603/free/p005.html>.
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techno-nationalists see nation-states as engaged in a competitive struggle in
which technological prowess is crucial. Atsushi Yamada, for example, writes
that the point of techno-nationalist policies is ‘‘to strengthen the competitive-
ness of domestic industries against foreign rivals.’’6 Joan Johnson-Freese and
Andrew Erickson put it more starkly, deﬁning techno-nationalism as ‘‘the idea
that technological strength is an effective determinant of national power in
a harshly competitive world.’’7 So-called ‘‘techno-globalists,’’ in contrast, are
less likely to see technology as the focus of international competition and more
likely to perceive opportunities for international collaboration.
Second, the most recent work emphasizes that techno-nationalism has prag-
matic variants, particularly in the Asian context. In other words, states may
adopt a mix of nationalistic and liberal policies in pursuit of national techno-
logical goals. Atsushi Yamada, for example, coined the term ‘‘neo-techno-
nationalism’’ to refer to the pursuit of national technological goals through
a combination of greater state activism and more openness toward foreigners.8
William Keller and Richard Samuels point to ‘‘technohybrid’’ regimes, which
‘‘self-consciously invite high-technology foreign direct investment as a means of
technical learning in order to achieve explicit national goals.’’9 Segal and Kang
point to Asia’s ‘‘open techno-nationalism’’ to describe the combination of
nationalistic and liberal policies so often seen in the region.10 Scott Kennedy,
Richard Suttmeier, and Jun Su distinguish between ‘‘ideological’’ and ‘‘instru-
mental’’ techno-nationalists.11The latter believe that government policy should
be ﬂexible and should exploit opportunities to source technology from abroad,
even as they distrust foreign suppliers over the long run.
6. Atsushi Yamada, ‘‘Neo-Techno-Nationalism: How and Why It Grows,’’ Columbia Interna-
tional Affairs Online (March 2000), <http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/yaa01/>.
7. Joan Johnson-Freese and Andrew S. Erickson, ‘‘A Geotechnological Balancer: The Emerging
China-EU Space Partnership,’’ Space Policy: An International Journal 22:1 (Spring 2006), p. 12.
8. Yamada, ‘‘Neo-Techno-Nationalism: How and Why It Grows’’; See also Richard Suttmeier
and Yao Xiangkui, ‘‘China’s Post-WTO Technology Policy: Standards, Software, and the Changing
Nature of Techno-Nationalism,’’ National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report, no. 7 (May
2004).
9. William W. Keller and Richard Samuels, ‘‘Innovation and the Asian Economies,’’ in Keller
and Samuels, eds., Crisis and Innovation in Asian Technology (Cambridge, U. K.: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2003), p. 12.
10. Segal and Kang, ‘‘The Siren Song of Techno-nationalism.’’
11. Scott Kennedy, Richard P. Suttmeier, and Jun Su, ‘‘Standards, Stakeholders, and Innovation:
China’s Evolving Role in the Global Knowledge Economy,’’ National Bureau of Asian Research,
Special Report, no. 15 (September 2008), p. 9.
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In sum, while there is no standard deﬁnition of techno-nationalism, there
are points of agreement in the literature that has emerged around the concept.
Two stand out in particular. First, techno-nationalism can be understood as
a belief that technology is a crucial national asset in a highly competitive
world. Second, pragmatic variants of techno-nationalism are not uncommon,
and these embrace a mix of liberal and nationalistic policies in pursuit of
national technological goals. With this conceptual framework in mind, the
following section considers techno-nationalism in China, focusing on the
renewable energy sector.
TECHNO-NATIONALISM AND RENEWABLE ENERGY IN CHINA
How should we characterize Chinese thinking about national technological
development, and renewable energy technology in particular, in recent years?
To put the present in context, it is helpful to go back a bit further in history.
In the 1990s, nationalism in Chinese technology policy seemed to be at low
ebb. China’s leaders had opened the economy to foreign direct investment
(FDI) early in the decade, but efforts to ensure that inﬂows of FDI resulted in
technology spillover to domestic ﬁrms remained limited.12 The government
made science and technology (S&T) development a national priority in 1995,
ushering in growing interest in China’s ‘‘national innovation system,’’ but the
upshot was to increase government support for basic research and higher
education, rather than greater intervention in the market to support Chinese
ﬁrms.13 By the late 1990s, however, Chinese leaders seemed increasingly
dissatisﬁed with the results these policies were producing and were searching
for a new approach.14
China’s new approach would ultimately be unveiled in the form of the
MLP. This 38,000-character document was commissioned by the 16th Party
Congress in 2002 and publicly released by the State Council in 2006 after
several years of deliberation. Touting itself as a ‘‘grand blueprint of science
12. Barry Naughton and Adam Segal, ‘‘China in Search of a Workable Model: Technology
Development in the New Millennium,’’ in Keller and Samuels, eds., Crisis and Innovation in Asian
Technology, p. 175.
13. Richard P. Suttmeier, Cong Cao, and Denis Simon, ‘‘China’s Innovation Challenge and the
Remaking of the Chinese Academy of Sciences,’’ Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization
1:3 (2006), pp. 81–82.
14. Naughton and Segal, ‘‘China in Search of a Workable Model,’’ pp. 175–78.
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and technology development’’ until 2020, the MLP offers a window on
mainstream thinking within the Chinese government on technology policy.
The report listed 11 ‘‘main areas and priority topics’’ that were seen as ‘‘critical
to economic and social development and national security and in dire need of
S&T [science and technology] support.’’ Energy was listed ﬁrst. The report
explained that developing new energy technologies was a priority for several
reasons:
Our country is currently suffering from sharp discrepancies between energy
supply and demand, an irrational energy structure, and low energy efﬁciency,
with predominantly coal-based primary energy consumption, resulting in
severe environmental pollution. Over the next 15 years, meeting the fast-
growing demand for energy and for its clean and efﬁcient utilization consti-
tutes a major challenge for the development of energy-related science and
technology.15
Not surprisingly, given the emphasis on ‘‘clean’’ energy, the MLP exhorted
China to ‘‘strive for breakthroughs in renewable energy, including wind
energy, solar energy, and biomass energy, and associated scale applications.’’
This emphasis on so-called ‘‘new renewables’’––and the lack of attention to
hydropower––makes sense from an economic and technology development
perspective. The former are seen as emerging industries in China with great
potential for growth.16 In contrast, while China’s hydropower sector is set for
considerable expansion over the next decade, after 2020 growth will slow:
China will have exploited most of its large hydropower resources. Large
hydropower projects have also become politically vexing for the Chinese
government, and since the 1990s Beijing has encountered substantial popular
resistance to them.17
TheMLP was a decidedly nationalistic document. It was deeply concerned
with the gap between China’s ‘‘S&T development’’ and that of developed
15. State Council, Guojia Zhongchangqi Kexue he Jishu Fazhan Guihua Gangyao (2006–20 Nian)
[National medium- and long-term program for science and technology development (2006–20)],
February 9, 2006, <http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm>. Subsequent MLP
quotations are from this source.
16. Lynette Ong, ‘‘The Apparent Paradox in China’s Climate Change Policies: Weak Interna-
tional Commitment on Emissions Reduction and Aggressive Renewable Energy Policy,’’ Asian
Survey 52:6 (2012), pp. 1150–58.
17. Andrew C. Mertha, China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change (Ithaca, N. Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2008).
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countries. As the MLP stated, ‘‘China’s overall S&T level still has a fairly big
gap to close, compared with that of developed nations.’’ The document also
maintained that China was engaged in a tough competition with other
countries for technological strength. As the MLP noted, ‘‘the nation will
be for a long period of time under enormous pressures from developed
nations [that] possess economic and S&T superiority.’’ In keeping with this
view, the report noted that it was difﬁcult to acquire valuable technologies
from other countries. As the MLP stated, ‘‘[F]acts have proved that, in areas
critical to the national economy and security, core technologies cannot be
purchased.’’ The report concluded that China had to ‘‘enhance its indigenous
innovation capability’’ in order to ‘‘take the initiative in the ﬁerce interna-
tional competition.’’
Nonetheless, the nationalistic edge of the MLP was also tempered by
worries about how much China could accomplish on its own. On the one
hand, the report seemed broadly conﬁdent in several respects. It touted the
country’s human capital in S&T, and argued that China’s combination of
socialist political structure with market mechanisms enabled the country to
mobilize efforts ‘‘to do great things’’ and to do so efﬁciently. On the other
hand, it enumerated a range of shortcomings in China’s own S&T system. It
criticized the innovative capability of Chinese enterprises as ‘‘weak.’’ It noted
that the S&T sector was too compartmentalized, and management of the
S&T system was ‘‘terribly uncoordinated.’’ It also worried that the system did
a poor job of rewarding high achievers and encouraging innovation more
generally. Not surprisingly, therefore, it concluded that international coop-
eration would be very important for China going forward. In fact, the MLP
argued that China should try to expand its technology collaboration with the
rest of the world. Universities and research institutes were exhorted to set up
joint laboratories with foreign ones. Chinese enterprises were encouraged to
establish research and development (R&D) centers overseas, and multina-
tional corporations were invited to set up more R&D centers within China.
Clearly, the MLP was not sufﬁciently conﬁdent in China’s domestic capabil-
ities to endorse a ‘‘go it alone’’ approach.
In sum, the MLP revealed a decidedly pragmatic variant of techno-
nationalism in Chinese ofﬁcial thinking about technology policy. While the
document viewed the development of new energy technologies, as well as
other technologies, as a competitive endeavor, it stopped well short of endors-
ing an autarkic approach.
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The arrival of the global ﬁnancial crisis in late 2008 accentuated the nation-
alism already evident in China’s approach to renewable energy. As early as
November 2008, Chinese ofﬁcials were suggesting that economic crises often
served as a springboard to technological revolutions, and that developed coun-
tries would compete with each other to be at the forefront of change.18 In this
context, China would need to invest in new industries or risk falling further
behind. In November 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao reprised this theme, stating
that ‘‘historical experience shows that economic crisis often breeds a new tech-
nological revolution.’’19 Wen lamented that China had repeatedly missed such
opportunities in the past, leaving it lagging behind, and he resolved that China
‘‘could not again miss the opportunity presented by a science and technology
revolution.’’ With respect to new energy in particular, Wen noted that other
countries were ‘‘accelerating the promotion of green and low-carbon technol-
ogy as a symbol of the energy revolution.’’ Whether or not Wen’s reading of
history is accurate, other Chinese ofﬁcials have reiterated his view that China
faces a historic opportunity that must not be missed.20
Other leading ofﬁcials have echoed Wen’s relatively nationalistic views
with respect to new energy technologies. Li Keqiang served as executive vice
premier under Wen, playing an important role in energy policy before he
succeeded Wen as premier in March 2013. In January 2010, Li exhorted his
country to ‘‘step up innovation and grab the commanding heights in energy
development and international competition.’’21 Later that month, Xie
Zhenhua, vice chairman of the National Development and Reform Com-
mission (NDRC) and China’s lead negotiator on climate change issues,
elaborated on the theme of international competition. Xie told his audience
18. See Zhao Gang, ‘‘Wei You Jishu Geming Neng Jiu Jingji Weiji’’ [Only technological revo-
lution can save us from the economic crisis], Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times], November 19, 2008.
19. State Council, ‘‘Guowuyuan Zongli Wen Jiabao: Rang Keji Yinling Zhongguo Kechixu
Fazhan’’ [State Council Premier Wen Jiabao: Let science and technology lead China’s sustainable
development], November 3, 2009, <http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-11/23/content_1471208.htm>.
20. Zhang Shaoqun, Zhongguo Zhanluexing Xinxing Chanuye Fazhan yu Caizheng Zhengce
[Development and ﬁnancial policies to promote China’s strategic emerging industries] (Beijing:
Economic Science Press, 2010), pp. 14–15; Chen Qingtai, ‘‘Zizhu Chuangxin he Chanye Shengji’’
[Indigenous innovation and industrial upgrading] (Beijing: China CITIC Press, 2011), pp. 8, 177.
Zhang is a vice minister at the Chinese Ministry of Finance, while Chen is a researcher in the
Development Research Center of the State Council.
21. ‘‘Vice Premier Stresses Development of Energy-saving Industry,’’ Xinhua, January 8, 2010,
accessed through Factiva.
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that ‘‘while protracted negotiations on space development were taking place, in
reality every country has quietly started competing in low-carbon economic
development.’’22 Xie likened this competition to the space race during the Cold
War; he then noted that China faced ‘‘huge pressure from the developed
countries’’ since they ‘‘occupy a favorable position in the international low-
carbon economic competition thanks to their ﬁnancial and technological supe-
riority as well as domestic conditions that promote the growth of low-carbon
markets.’’23 In October 2010, Zhang Qiang, deputy director of the Institute of
International Technology and Economics at the State Council’s Development
Research Center, penned an essay for Global Times in which he argued that
‘‘the U.S. government has recognized that only through leading in the ﬁeld of
clean-energy technology can the United States achieve its strategic goal of
renovating its economy and maintaining hegemony.’’24 He cited various mea-
sures that the U.S. government has taken to support clean energy development
and cautioned his compatriots not to expect too much of Sino-American
cooperation in this ﬁeld. As Zhang wrote, ‘‘We have to understand that
although China and the U.S. regard clean-energy technology as a focus of
mutual exchange and cooperation, the U.S. government will not let China
share in its key technologies.’’25China should therefore ‘‘make its own strategies
for clean-energy technological development.’’26
Does the pragmatic side of Chinese techno-nationalism also remain evi-
dent after 2008? The emergence of the Strategic Emerging Industries (SEI)
initiative in 2009 and 2010 might seem to signal the emergence of a more
conﬁdent, go-it-alone outlook. The emphasis in the SEI initiative is not
merely on catching up with developed countries but ‘‘achieving leapfrog
development in key ﬁelds,’’ as the circular announcing it stated.27 New energy
technologies, including solar, wind, biomass, and next-generation nuclear
22. ‘‘Guojia Fazhan he Gaige Weiyuanhui Fuzhuren Xie Zhenhua Yanjiang’’ [NDRC Vice
Chairman Xie Zhenhua makes a speech], Xinlang Caijing [Sina Finance], January 9, 2010, <http://
ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/hy/20100109/11137218805.shtml>.
23. Ibid.
24. Zhang Qiang, ‘‘U.S. Won’t Share Its Clean-energy Initiatives with China,’’ Global Times,
October 11, 2010, <http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commentary/2010-10/580907.html>.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. State Council, ‘‘Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiakuai Peiyu he Fazhan Zhanluexing Xinxing Chanye de
Jueding’’ [State Council decision on accelerating the cultivation and development of strategic emerging
industries], October 10, 2010, <http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-10/18/content_1724848.htm>.
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technologies, are an important part of the initiative.28 Nonetheless, the cir-
cular also cited reasons for continuing engagement with the outside world. It
recognized a number of serious problems that would continue to hold China
back, including the weak innovative capacity of Chinese enterprises, problems
related to the ﬁnancing of innovation, and difﬁculties related to bringing new
technologies and products to the market. The circular also stressed the need for
continuing international cooperation, calling for foreign companies to set up
R&D centers in China and for more foreign investment in key sectors. In
short, for all its ambition, the SEI initiative remains essentially pragmatic.
In fact, it should be noted that some Chinese government analysts remain
guardedly optimistic about the prospects for international cooperation in
renewable energy. Some cite the creation of the U.S.-China Clean Energy
Research Center (CERC) as evidence of the potential for Sino-American
cooperation in clean energy technology. While funding for the center re-
mains modest, and while the areas of cooperation remain limited, it is seen as
an opportunity through which China can learn how the U.S. approaches
scientiﬁc research.29 Other optimists discount the CERC, and government-
to-government cooperation more generally, and focus instead on the interests
of corporate actors, which they see as conducive to international collabora-
tion in the renewable sphere.30 In 2010, for example, Li Junfeng and Chang
Yu took this view in an intriguing article entitled ‘‘The New Global Game in
New Energy.’’31 They noted that trade friction between China and developed
countries was ‘‘possible at any time,’’ but they added that ‘‘new energy is
a globalized industry’’ and that, given the interconnections between various
companies involved, trade barriers would be injurious to all parties. In a sep-
arate article, Li argued that all companies operating in the Chinese market
ought to be treated equally, regardless of origin, to maximize competition.32
28. The SEI’s seven industries include energy and environmental conservation, next generation
information technology, bio-technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new energy, new
materials, and new energy automobiles.
29. Author’s interview at a state-owned research institute, Beijing, September 23, 2011.
30. Author’s interview at a state-owned research institute, Beijing, September 19, 2011.
31. Li Junfeng and Chang Yu, ‘‘Quanqiu Xin Nengyuan de Xin Boyi’’ [The new global game in
new energy], Shishi Baogao [Report on Current Events], no. 11 (2010), pp. 50–55. Li is deputy director
of the NDRC’s Energy Research Institute, while Chang is senior policy analyst for the New Energy
Committee of the China Association for Comprehensive Resource Utilization.
32. Li Junfeng, ‘‘Fazhanhao Xin Nengyuan Chanye, Zhengfu Yinggai Zuo Shenme?’’ [To develop
the new energy industry, what should government do?], Lu Ye [Green Leaf], no. 8 (2010), p. 13.
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Competitive nationalism is thus not the only note in Chinese discussions of
new energy technologies, even if it appears to be the primary theme among
the highest ofﬁcials.
To sum up, China’s thinking about technological development––including
the renewable energy sector––continues to reﬂect a pragmatic strain of techno-
nationalism. Although one can discern more globalist views, the MLP and the
statements of top ofﬁcials emphasize international competition and the need
for China to reduce its dependence on the outside world. Yet, there is also
a clear belief that China must continue to engage with the outside world in
order to improve its technical expertise in this arena. This pragmatically nation-
alistic orientation predates the global ﬁnancial crisis, but the crisis did instill
a sense that China must extend its ambitions if it is not to fall further behind.
CHINA’S SUPPORT FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FIRMS:
TESTING THE LIMITS
Support for domestic industries in China is nothing new. Chinese state-
owned enterprises in particular have long beneﬁtted from preferential ar-
rangements, including cheap ﬁnancing from state banks, tax breaks, subsi-
dized electricity, and subsidized land. The following analysis is concerned
with policies targeting Chinese renewable energy ﬁrms in particular. It ﬁnds
these programs largely consistent with China’s pragmatic strain of techno-
nationalism. While the Chinese government has often tilted the playing ﬁeld
toward domestic ﬁrms, marginalizing foreign competitors, Beijing typically
backs down when such practices are challenged by important economic
partners. In short, China has been less cooperative with the outside world
than one would expect a techno-globalist state to be, but it has been more
cooperative than one would expect a hard-line techno-nationalist state to be.
To begin, China ofﬁcially encourages foreign investment in the renewable
energy sector. Spurred by the need to meet WTO requirements, China has
substantially liberalized its FDI regime since the late 1990s.33 China also
agreed to phase out many requirements that foreign investors transfer tech-
nology to local partners, although this remains a gray area, and Chinese
negotiators still ask foreign companies to make such transfers in exchange
33. Chen Chunlai, ‘‘The Development of China’s FDI Laws and Policies after WTO Accession,’’
in Jane Golley and Ligang Song, eds., Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities (Canberra:
ANU E-Press, 2011), pp. 85–97.
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for market access.34 Starting in 2002, China designated foreign investment in
speciﬁc sectors as ‘‘encouraged,’’ ‘‘restricted,’’ or ‘‘prohibited,’’ in its Catalogue
for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, and this has highlighted
Beijing’s interest in attracting foreign investment in renewable energy, as well
as other high-tech sectors. The construction and management of new energy
power plants (including wind and solar power generation facilities) were
‘‘encouraged’’ in the 2002 Catalogue, as well as in the revised versions pub-
lished in 2004, 2007, and 2011.35 The 2011 Catalogue was notable for its
encouragement of foreign investment in high-tech, environmentally friendly
areas, with new green industries added to the ‘‘encouraged’’ category. There
are exceptions to this openness, however. Beijing has stipulated that devel-
opers of offshore wind power projects, for example, must be Chinese-owned
or Chinese-controlled joint ventures.36
Although it is generally open to foreign investment, the Chinese govern-
ment has sought to help domestic renewable energy companies succeed in the
face of foreign competition. At the same time, Beijing remains pragmatic in
this regard, willing to back down when its techno-nationalist policies are
challenged. The wind sector is worth examining in particular, as it has been
the main focus of renewable energy growth outside of hydropower in China
since 2005. The wind power industry developed slowly in China in the 1980s
and 1990s because of high costs and limited policy support. This changed in
the early 2000s, however. In 2003, the NDRC announced the Wind Power
Concession Project, which promoted the development of large-scale wind
farms and required developers to employ wind power technology with 50%
local content.37 The local content requirement was increased to 70% soon
34. Kathryn Kranhold, ‘‘China’s Price for Market Access: Give Us Your Technology, Too,’’Wall
Street Journal, February 26, 2004, <http://online.wsj.com/article/0,SB107775213437639391,00.html>;
Joanna Lewis, Green Innovation in China: China’s Wind Power Industry and the Global Transition to
the Low-Carbon Economy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 115.
35. For the 2002 Catalogue, see <http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?
docid¼51272>; for the 2004 Catalogue, see <http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_
info.jsp?docid¼87902>; for the 2007 Catalogue, see <http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/
law_en_info.jsp?docid¼87372>; for the 2011 Catalogue, see <http://www.fdi.com.cn/app?page¼
LawDetailEn&service¼page&id¼5c42bce337da5f930137db33576e00>.
36. The Chinese government has justiﬁed this restriction by stating that it seeks to protect
sensitive oceanic and ocean current information. See Melinda Xie, ‘‘China Issues Offshore Wind
Farm Regulations,’’ Mondaq Business Brieﬁng, February 16, 2010, accessed through Factiva.
37. China’s methodology for evaluating local content, which dates to 1987, entails calculating the
value of locally made components and parts as a share of the value of a complete kit needed to
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thereafter. In 2005, the NDRC stipulated that the local content requirement
would apply to all wind power projects in China.38
Over the next several years, Chinese companies rapidly increased their
share of the country’s wind power market. Whereas in 2004, three-
quarters of all wind turbines installed in China were foreign-made, by
2010, Chinese companies controlled 85% of the market.39 In fact, by late
2010, Chinese ﬁrms were supplying about half of the US$45 billion global
market for wind turbines.40 The extent to which these extraordinary changes
reﬂected the local content requirement, as opposed to other factors, remains
unclear. Foreign ﬁrms responded to the requirement by building their own
factories in China in order to comply with it. Some observers claim that these
investments met with limited success because Chinese companies proceeded
to best their foreign competitors on price, which was a major consideration
for state-owned developers.41 Others point out that the foreign ﬁrms were
forced to develop networks of domestic parts suppliers in order to begin
production in China, and that these newly trained suppliers were of consid-
erable beneﬁt to Chinese ﬁrms because they sought to approximate the
quality of multinational manufacturers.42
-
assemble a product. See Ding Zhao and Xu Tao, ‘‘Tongyi Guochanhualu de Jisuanfangfa Shixian
Jingji Kaohe Gongzuo Guifanhua’’ [Standardizing the calculation method of localization rate and
normalizing economic assessment], Jingji Gongzuo Tongxun [Economic Work Newsletter], no. 1
(1988), pp. 26–27.
38. On China’s support for the wind sector, see Joanna Lewis, ‘‘Building a National Wind
Turbine Industry: Experiences from China, India, and South Korea,’’ International Journal of
Technology and Globalisation 5:3/4 (2011), pp. 283–87; Qiang Wang, ‘‘Effective Policies for Renewable
Energy—the Example of China’s Wind Power—Lessons for China’s Photovoltaic Power,’’
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 14:2 (2010), p. 705; and Dewey & LeBoeuf, LLP, ‘‘China’s
Promotion of the Renewable Electric Power Equipment Industry––Hydro, Wind, Solar, Biomass,’’
report prepared for the National Foreign Trade Council (March 2010), pp. 51–53, <http://www.
google.com.au/url?sa¼t&rct¼j&q¼&esrc¼s&source¼web&cd¼1&ved¼0CC4QFjAA&url¼http
%3A%2F%2Fwww.nftc.org%2Fdefault%2FPress%2520Release%2F2010%2FChina%2520Renewable
%2520Energy.pdf&ei¼snCZUbbtJYrQiAfYwYDYAQ&usg¼AFQjCNHI2hTbn0t6LAHftr2rW8g
UKPRvyw&sig2¼MnF_lJ4XFU16rcnkXaXiSA&bvm¼bv.46751780, d.aGc&cad¼rja>.
39. China Greentech Initiative, The China Greentech Report 2011: China’s Emergence as a Global
Greentech Market Leader (April 2011), p. 79, <http://www.china-greentech.com/report>.
40. Keith Bradsher, ‘‘To Conquer Wind Power, China Writes the Rules,’’ New York Times,
December 14, 2010. On the response of foreign companies to the local content requirement, see
Lewis, Green Innovation in China, pp. 75–120.
41. China Greentech Initiative, The China Greentech Report 2011.
42. Bradsher, ‘‘To Conquer Wind Power, China Writes the Rules.’’
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In any case, China began to face external pressure to eliminate the require-
ment in the second half of 2009, when the newly installed Obama admin-
istration in the U.S. began to press the issue in bilateral discussions. Shortly
after it was raised, China announced that it would revoke the requirement.
China’s rapid decision to abolish the measure was presumably made easier by
the stunning success of Chinese wind energy ﬁrms over the previous several
years. Nonetheless, the timing of China’s announcement suggests that for-
eign pressure played a role as well.
Soon after the local content requirement was abolished, China came under
pressure over subsidies provided to domestic wind power ﬁrms. Starting in
2008, China’s ‘‘Special Fund for Wind Power Equipment Manufacturing’’
had provided grants ranging from $6.7 million to $22.5 million to Chinese
wind turbine manufacturers to incentivize the use of domestic equipment,
and this practice continued into 2010. In late 2010, however, the Obama
administration lodged a complaint with the WTO charging that the subsidies
were prohibited under the organization’s rules. The two sides then took up
the issue in bilateral discussions in early 2011. In June of that year, China
agreed to terminate the program before the case was heard by the WTO.43
The pattern of favoring domestic ﬁrms and then retreating under pressure
has also been evident in policy toward renewable energy more broadly, as well
as other types of technologies. In 2006, the MLP had stated that government
procurement policy could be an important means of promoting domestic
technology products. Over the next few years, a number of provincial and
local governments developed catalogs of technology products to receive pref-
erential treatment in procurement. In 2009, the NDRC, the Ministry of
S&T, and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued Circular 618, which formally
announced the creation of a national-level catalog of domestic technology
products. Circular 618 identiﬁed six broad categories of products that were to
be targeted, one of which was ‘‘new energy and equipment’’ technologies.
Sub-categories included wind, solar, and biomass technologies.44
Circular 618 quickly elicited international criticism, especially since the
market for government procurement in China had been estimated at tens
43. ‘‘China Agrees to Halt Wind Power Subsidies Rather Than Fight U.S. inWTO,’’ Inside U.S.-
China Trade, June 8, 2011, accessed through Factiva.
44. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘Issues Brief: China’s Domestic Innovation and Government
Procurement Policies,’’ updated March 2011, <http://www.uschina.org/public/documents/ . . . /
innovation_procurement_brief.pdf>.
922  ASIAN SURVEY 53:5
of billions of dollars. Although China was not a member of the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement prohibiting discrimination, Beijing
began to backtrack nonetheless. In April 2010, the central government pub-
lished draft revisions to Circular 618 that softened some of its requirements.
The draft indicated, for example, that products could be accredited as ‘‘indig-
enous’’ if they were based on intellectual property that was licensed from
overseas (as opposed to owned by a Chinese entity).45 Foreign companies
remained unsatisﬁed, however, and continued to press for a reversal of the
policy. In January 2011, President Hu Jintao told U.S. President Barack
Obama while visiting Washington that China would sever the link between
its procurement policies and its innovation policies. In May of that year,
Chinese representatives at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
committed to eliminate all government procurement indigenous innovation
catalogs. Although implementation at the provincial and local level remains
a work in progress, it is clear that China’s leaders are trying to balance their
desire to nurture domestic technology companies with their desire to main-
tain links with the outside world.
More recently, China’s support for solar energy companies has become
a source of international controversy. In November 2011, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce launched an anti-dumping and countervailing duty
investigation into solar exports from China. The investigation responded
to allegations that Chinese solar companies were beneﬁtting from a range
of unfair trade practices, including land grants, contract awards, trade bar-
riers, ﬁnancing breaks, and subsidies. The issue was politically sensitive,
coming a few months after Solyndra, a U.S. solar company that had received
a $535 million loan guarantee from the Department of Energy, announced
that it was ﬁling for bankruptcy––a development that was widely blamed on
low-cost Chinese competition. In October 2012, the U.S. Commerce Depart-
ment announced anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties on Chinese solar
manufacturers, with combined duties ranging from 24% to 250%.46 In June
45. Ministry of S&T of the People’s Republic of China, ‘‘Guanyu Kaizhan 2010 Nian Guojia
Zizhu Chuangxin Chanpin Rending Gongzuo de Tongzhi (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao)’’ [Notice on the
launch of national indigenous innovation product accreditation work for 2010 (draft for soliciting
input)], April 2010, <http://www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201004/t20100409_76710.htm>.
46. ‘‘U.S. Trade Panel Approves Five-year Duties on China Solar Products,’’ Reuters, November
7, 2012, accessed through Factiva.
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2013, following its own investigation, the EU announced preliminary anti-
dumping tariffs on Chinese solar exports as well.
China has proven more combative in these disputes than in the earlier
clashes over wind power and government procurement. Rather than back
down in response to the tariffs, the Chinese government launched retaliatory
investigations into polysilicon exports from the U.S., South Korea, and the
EU, as well as wine exports from Europe. China’s stiffer stance in these cases
is likely a function of several factors speciﬁc to these disputes. First, the global
solar industry is under pressure worldwide, stemming from slumping prices
and overcapacity. Beijing is presumably reluctant to curtail support for its
solar industry at a moment of weakness. Second, China’s leaders have been
preoccupied with the country’s leadership transition of 2012–13. It is thus
a particularly difﬁcult time for them to appear ‘‘soft’’ under pressure from
foreign countries. Third, both the U.S. and the EU were internally divided
over whether to impose the tariffs. The U.S. ran a trade surplus with China in
solar energy equipment and materials estimated at between $247 million and
$539 million in 2011, thanks to U.S. ﬁrms that export capital equipment and
polysilicon to Chinese manufacturers. Many of these ﬁrms lobbied against
the tariffs.47 Within the EU, 18 of 27 member countries, including Germany
and Britain, resisted imposing tariffs before the European Commission
decided to proceed.48 Such internal opposition may well have emboldened
China to take a tougher line in these disputes. Indeed, China’s tougher
approach paid off in the European case: the EU quickly reached a settlement
with China on terms favorable to Beijing.49
More disputes in the renewable energy sphere are likely. Indeed, some are
already underway. The U.S., the EU, and Japan have asked the WTO to
investigate China’s export restraints on rare earths, tungsten, and molybde-
num. These materials are used in the manufacture of many high-technology
products, including wind turbines and solar panels. The complainants have
47.Greentech Media,U.S. Solar Energy Trade Assessment 2011: Trade Flows and Domestic Content
for Solar Energy-Related Goods and Services in the United States, report prepared for the Solar Energy
Industry Association, August 2011, p. 16, <www.seia.org>.
48. Robin Emmott and Ethan Bilby, ‘‘EU Gives China Two Months to Resolve Solar Panel
Row,’’ Reuters, June 4, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/04/us-eu-china-solar-idUSB
RE9530EF20130604>.
49. Joshua Chafﬁn, ‘‘EU and China Settle Trade Fight over Solar Panels,’’ Financial Times, July
27, 2013, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4e468c26-f6ab-11e2-8620-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2fJU
MAXH7>.
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alleged that the restrictions give Chinese companies an unfair advantage over
foreign competitors. In July 2012, the WTO established a panel to investigate
the matter, and a ruling is now expected in late 2013.
Emerging technical standards for China’s ‘‘smart grid’’ could become
another point of contention.50 China is modernizing its grid so that it can
absorb the variable and intermittent power that is typically supplied by wind
and solar generators, but the question remains how this process will unfold.
In the past, China has sometimes tried to shape technical standards to pro-
mote domestic companies, while in other cases it has worked to develop new
standards in collaboration with foreign enterprises.51 In September 2012, the
EU Chamber of Commerce in China complained that ‘‘European companies
are excluded from the standard drafting process for smart grids in China’’ and
noted that the process was dominated by the State Grid Corporation of
China (SGCC), raising questions about market access in the future.52 The
development of domestically oriented standards could have implications not
only for suppliers of smart grid technology but also for suppliers of the
renewable energy equipment that will have to be compatible with the grid.
More generally, China’s emerging SEI initiative could become a key point
of contention. Beijing reportedly plans to pour a staggering $1.7 trillion into
the seven SEI industries between 2011 and 2015.53 Most of the funds will not
be spent by Beijing, but will be the result of policies that encourage new
spending by corporations, investments by local governments, and lending by
Chinese banks. Chinese ofﬁcials have assured foreign ﬁrms that they will have
equal access to these opportunities as domestic ﬁrms. There are likely to be
tensions, however, particularly in renewable energy. Solar energy is expected
to be an important focus in the clean energy sector, and the ﬁve-year plan for
solar energy released in February 2012 calls for 80% of production equipment
50. Smart grids use information technology and two-way communication to improve the efﬁ-
ciency, reliability, and sustainability of the production and distribution of electricity. Technical
standards specify uniform engineering and technical criteria that allow a range of different technol-
ogy products to work together.
51. Kennedy, Suttmeier, and Su, ‘‘Standards, Stakeholders, and Innovation’’; Scott Kennedy,
‘‘The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining China’s Involvement in High-Tech
Standards Wars,’’ Asia Policy, no. 2 (2006), pp. 41–62; Adam Segal, Advantage: How American
Innovation Can Overcome the Asian Challenge (New York: Norton, 2011), pp. 81–84.
52. The EU Chamber of Commerce in China, Position Paper 2012/2013, p. 225, <http://www.
europeanchamber.com.cn/en/chamber-publications>.
53. Chris Buckley, ‘‘China Conﬁrms $1.7 Trillion Spending Plan: U.S.,’’ Reuters, November 21,
2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/us-china-us-idUSTRE7AK0MT2011112>.
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and associated materials for photovoltaic cells to be produced domestically by
2015.54 Reaching that target will likely displease China’s trading partners.
Industrial espionage also looms as a growing source of discord between
China and the outside world. Over the past several years, China has acquired
a reputation as a preeminent practitioner of industrial espionage, with partic-
ular concern about computer network intrusions that originate in China, as
well as the targeting of Chinese citizens or individuals with family ties to China
who have access to the networks of foreign companies. A report published by
the U.S. intelligence community in 2011 called China and Russia ‘‘the most
aggressive collectors of U.S. economic information and technology.’’55 That
same year, Bloomberg reported that the networks of at least 760 foreign com-
panies, research universities, Internet service providers, and government agen-
cies had been hit over the previous decade by ‘‘cyber spies’’ based in China.56
New energy technologies, in turn, are an important area of concern. The
U.S. intelligence report noted that clean energy was one of several priority
sectors for China that ‘‘may be targeted more aggressively.’’57 Indeed, there
are already high proﬁle cases in the new energy ﬁeld. In 2011, for example,
American Semiconductor (AMSC) charged Sinovel, China’s largest maker of
wind turbines, with stealing proprietary software. AMSC has ﬁled four law-
suits worth $1.2 billion against Sinovel in China for theft of trade secrets and
for failing to honor existing contracts. As of this writing, this legal dispute had
yet to be resolved. In June 2013, however, a federal grand jury in the U.S.
indicted Sinovel, which exported turbines with the allegedly stolen software
to the U.S., for intellectual property theft.58
54. ‘‘Taiyangneng Guangfu Chanye ‘Shierwu’ Fazhan Guihua’’ [Solar energy photovoltaic
industry ‘12–5’ developmental program],’’ February 24, 2012, <http://miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n1129383
2/n11293907/n11368223/14473431.html>.
55. United States Ofﬁce of the National Counterintelligence Executive, ‘‘Foreign Spies Stealing
U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and
Industrial Espionage, 2009–2011,’’ October 2011, p. 4, <http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/
fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf>.
56. Michael Riley and John Walcott, ‘‘China-based Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber
Cold War,’’ Bloomberg, December 15, 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-13/china-
based-hacking-of-760-companies-reﬂects-undeclared-global-cyber-war.html>.
57. United States Ofﬁce of the National Counterintelligence Executive, ‘‘Foreign Spies Stealing
U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace,’’ p. 8.
58. Erin Ailworth, ‘‘Chinese Firm Charged with Stealing Tech from Mass. Company,’’ Boston
Globe, June 27, 2013, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/06/27/feds-charge-chinese-ﬁrm-
with-stealing-technology-mass-company-amsc/CTE66TzhtD19qvEfU35RQN/story.html>.
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Regardless of the outcome in the AMSC-Sinovel case, it will likely be more
difﬁcult to pressure China on industrial espionage than in the other policy
arenas described above. First, the clandestine nature of the activity naturally
makes it more difﬁcult to detect than a publicly proclaimed government
policy. Even when espionage has been detected, foreign companies are often
reluctant to publicize instances of intellectual property theft by Chinese
actors, since they worry about reprisals from the Chinese government. With-
out timely information from corporate actors, it can be difﬁcult for national
governments to respond to such practices. Lastly, while a recent report has
highlighted the role of the Chinese military in industrial espionage, in other
cases the role of the Chinese government (if any) can be difﬁcult to ascer-
tain.59 The 2011U.S. intelligence report, for example, noted complaints about
‘‘an onslaught’’ of computer network intrusions originating from IP addresses
in China, but confessed that the intelligence community had not been able to
attribute many private sector data breaches to a Chinese state sponsor.60 The
U.S. has recently begun to increase public pressure on Beijing to rein in
Chinese cyber-spying, but it remains unclear whether and how quickly such
pressure will succeed. In the meantime, it may pay to persuade Chinese
leaders that extensive reliance on industrial espionage will ultimately under-
mine efforts to promote a culture of innovation in China and thereby retard
its technological development, rather than promoting it.61
CONCLUSION
China’s enthusiasm for renewable energy is striking, but so are its efforts to
reduce its reliance on the outside world for the underlying technologies. The
preceding pages have demonstrated that China’s techno-nationalism in this
regard is decidedly pragmatic. In particular, the nationalist impulses of Chi-
na’s leaders are tempered by worries about how much China can accomplish
on its own. China’s policies, in turn, are consistent with this pragmatism.
59. Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, February 2013, <http://
intelreport.mandiant.com/>.
60. United States Ofﬁce of the National Counterintelligence Executive, ‘‘Foreign Spies Stealing
U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace,’’ p. 5.
61. Adam Segal, ‘‘Innovation, Espionage, and Chinese Technology Policy,’’ prepared statement
before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 15, 2011,
Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/china/innovation-espionage-chinese-technology-
policy/p24686>.
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Although the Chinese government has favored domestic ﬁrms in the renew-
able energy industry, Beijing tends to back down when such efforts are
challenged by important economic partners. This is not to suggest that China
can simply be pushed around––witness the ongoing dispute in the solar
sector––but its broader tendency has been to seek solutions to such confron-
tations sooner rather than later. With more trade tensions looming on the
horizon, China’s pragmatism will be put to the test on a regular basis.
There are several important questions that arise from these ﬁndings. First,
how well has China balanced its techno-nationalist goals with its need for
international cooperation? In some ways, China seems to have been quite
successful. The local content requirement for wind turbines, for example,
prompted foreign companies to localize production in China. Yet, even with
this inﬂux of investment, Chinese ﬁrms have come to dominate the domestic
wind industry and become important global players. In other respects, how-
ever, the record is less encouraging. Faced with slowing growth and overca-
pacity, some foreign wind ﬁrms have begun to reduce their footprint in
China.62 In addition, it is not clear that such a decisive triumph for Chinese
wind ﬁrms has served the country well. While Chinese turbines are cheaper,
they usually require more maintenance and are not designed to last as long as
those made by the leading foreign ﬁrms.63
Second, it would be useful to compare techno-nationalism in China’s
renewable energy sector with that in other high-technology sectors. Other
scholars have explored its role in the information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) sector, for example, so this would seem a particularly pertinent
comparison.64 In addition, it would be worth exploring how China’s
approach to renewable energy compares with its approach to nuclear power.
China has been relatively willing to import nuclear energy technologies, even
though this is a ﬁeld of high-technology mentioned in the MLP and even
though nuclear power is set to play a greater role in China’s energy portfolio.
Other scholars maintain that this more open attitude in nuclear power
62. Anirban Chowdhury, ‘‘Suzlon to Exit China after Asset Sale,’’ Wall Street Journal Online,
August 14, 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444318104577588441246383070.
html>.
63. Author’s interview with a Chinese wind industry expert, Beijing, July 2, 2013.
64. For examples, see Suttmeier and Yao, ‘‘China’s Post-WTO Technology Policy’’; National
Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report, no. 7; Kennedy, Suttmeier, and Su, ‘‘Standards, Stake-
holders, and Innovation.’’
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reﬂects safety concerns, a desire to learn from more advanced designs, and an
unwillingness, for reasons of status, to settle for second-best technology.65 Even
so, China is currently supporting advanced research on next-generation nuclear
reactors with some success, raising the question of how long this more open
attitude will persist.
Third, it is important to explore the impact of techno-nationalist policies
on the character of China’s interdependence with the outside world. It is easy
to imagine that such policies will help China become more self-reliant, as
Chinese ﬁrms come to supplant foreign competitors (as they have done in the
wind sector). On the other hand, recent research suggests that the growing
sophistication of Chinese ﬁrms may help to usher in new forms of interde-
pendence.66 In an intriguing case in the wind sector, for example, a European
ﬁrm and a Chinese partner worked together to develop a ‘‘new to the world’’
turbine technology in which each ﬁrm learned from the other party. The
foreign party provided design and engineering expertise; the Chinese party
understood how to create cost-competitive products out of a complicated
design, based on extensive production experience. In another case in the solar
industry, a U.S. ﬁrm and a Chinese partner undertook a joint R&D effort
that successfully developed a new high-efﬁciency solar cell. The success cre-
ated a new market for a technology that had been invented by the American
ﬁrm. In short, as Chinese ﬁrms gain technical prowess, foreign ﬁrms will face
not only new competitors but also new opportunities for collaboration.
Lastly, and most broadly, it is worth exploring in more detail the forces
behind the most recent surge of techno-nationalism in China. As noted at the
outset of this essay, techno-nationalism has a long history in China, and its
origins can be traced to the humiliations suffered by the Qing Dynasty in the
19th century. Yet, techno-nationalism has undergone a renaissance in China
in the past decade, particularly with the release of the MLP and the launch of
the SEI initiative. To the extent that this resurgence reﬂects the inclinations
of individual leaders––speciﬁcally, former top leaders Hu Jintao and Wen
65. Ed Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 165–66; Wang Haibin, ‘‘Nuclear Straw Man: Inﬂuences on
China’s Foreign Nuclear Energy Relationship by Its Economic and Security Considerations,’’
unpublished manuscript, June 2010.
66. On the following points, see Jonas Nahm and Edward S. Steinfeld, ‘‘Reinventing Mass
Production: China’s Specialization in Innovative Manufacturing,’’ Social Science Research Network,
Working Paper (July 2012), <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id¼2159429>.
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Jiabao––it is possible that we will see a different approach over the next
several years as a new generation of Chinese leaders takes charge. Thus far,
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang seem to support the pragmatic techno-nationalism
of Hu and Wen, but they may depart from it in signiﬁcant ways as they
become more established at the apex of China’s political system. Alterna-
tively, if China’s techno-nationalism reﬂects deeper forces––such as the pres-
sures of a particular developmental stage in a rapidly modernizing
economy––the current orientation would seem more likely to persist and
perhaps even intensify. If so, the critical question will be just how pragmatic
China’s techno-nationalism remains as its development continues.
930  ASIAN SURVEY 53:5
